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YiELDSON DiRECT PLACEMENTS
AND YiELDS ON PUBLIC OFFERiNGS
This chapter attempts to respond to the following question: are
yields on direct placements higher than, lower than, or about the
same as yields on comparable public offerings?
A priori, we would expect that yields
1would
be about the same for comparable issues sold at the same time—
regardless of whether they were direct placements or public offer-
ings—provided only that the issues being compared had' had clear
access to both markets. Why, after all, should any company sell an
issue to yield 4.2 per cent in the direct placement market when
comparable issues are selling in the public market to yield 4.0 per
cent?
The findings here suggest that two more or less separate markets
exist with' perhaps some overlap: The public market has a com-
petitive advantage with respect to the issues of the larger, better-
known companies 'and hence tends to specialize in such issues.
Yields on such issues tend to be lower 'in the public market. On' the
other hand, the direct placement market has a competitive advantage
with respect to the issues of smaller, lesser-known companies and
hence tends to specialize in 'such issues. Yields on these issues tend
to be lower in the direct placement market.
Yields Net-to-the-issuer
The cost of flotation of public issues is not negligible. On Septem-
ber 7, 1951, for example, The National Container Corporation
1Thatis, after adjustment for cost of flotation.126 Yieldson Corporate Debt Directly Placed
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sold a 41/2percent $20 million issue, rated Baa, at a cost of
flotation of 4 per cent of the offering price. This meant that Na-
tional Container received 4 per cent less than $20.0 million, or $19.2
million. Interest charges of 41/2percent on the face amount (plus,
of course, repayment at maturity of the .1 ace amount) raised Na-
tional Container's effective cost to 4.88 per.. cent, or by 38 basis
points. This is an extreme case but, as Table 62 indicates, cost of
flotation can make a difference in cost on issues of every size and
especially on smaller issues of lesser quality..Inany case, however,
it seems obvious that the issuer, in choosing between a direct place-
ment and a public offering, will compare effective yields rather
than nominal yields.
In order to arrive at yields net-to-the-issuer, we should adjust
not merely for the cost of flotation of public offerings but also for
the cost of flotation of direct placements, and other differential
costs. Unhappily, this is easier said than done. Data on the under-
writing costs of public offerings are publicly available and, for theDirect Placements and Public Offerings 127
TABLE63
Underwriting Costs or Fees Paid to Agents,
and Other Expenses, as Per Cent of Offering
Price, by Size of issue for Direct Placements




Costs or Fees Other Expenses
Size of Issuea Direct Public Direct Public
(million dollars)PlacementsOfferingsPlacementsOfferings
0—499 1.70 7.34 1.14 2.88
500—999 1.39 5.51 .85 3.21
1,000—2,999 .86 3.52 .54 2.09
3,000—4,999 .61 1.41 .40 1.28
5,000—9,999 .59 .88 .32 1.03
10,000—24,999 .31 .99 .25 .73
25,000 and over .22 .72 .17 .43
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission. For years, see text.
aClass intervals not strictly uniform in all cases as between direct
placements and public offerings.
period since January 1, 1951, have been put into convenient form
by Halsey, Stuart and Company.2 But data on fees paid to agents
by issuers in connection with the sale of direct placements and data
on the other expenses of both types of issues are not systematically
available.3 The Securities and Exchange Commission has made
estimates for three years for direct placements (1947, 1949, and
1950) and for five years for public offerings (1945—49)
Thepertinent figures are reproduced in Table 63. Two things
clear: first, the differential in favor of direct placements is large,
2 See Competitive Sales and Negotiated Public Offerings of New Public Utility,
Railroad and industrial Debt issues, Chicago (undated).
Other expenses include listing fees, federal revenue stamps, state taxes and
fees, trustee fees, printing and engraving, legal fees, accounting fees, engineering
fees.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Privately-Placed Securities—Cost of
Flotation (corrected printing), Washington, D.C., September 1952.128 Yields on Corporate Debt Directly Placed
especially on the smaller issues; for a company considering an issue
of less than $500 thousand dollars, the total cost (underwriting
plus other expense) averaged 10.22 per cent of offering price for
a public offering (7.34 plus 2.88) but only about 3 per cent for a
direct placement.5 The difference (7 percentage points on a fifteen-
year, 4 per cent issue) is equal to about 65 basis points. Although
the difference on large issues is considerably less, it is not negligible;
even when a fee was paid to an agent on a direct placement, the
difference was about 7 basis points for issues of over $10 million
and about 5 basis points for issues of over $25 million.
Second, Table 63 suggests that for every size of issue the differ-
ence in "other expenses," in favor of direct placements, was roughly
the same as the fee paid to an agent in connection with a direct
placement. Thus, in the smallest class the difference in "other ex-
penses," 1.74 (=2.88—1.14),is almost equal to the fees paid to
agents. In the largest class the difference was .26 (=.43—.17),
about equal to the fees paid in that class. The relationship is rough
and it is not uniform from class to class but it enables us to dis-
regard fees paid on direct placements and other expenses on both
types of issues; i.e., it enables us to put both types of issues on a
comparable, net-cost-to-the-issuer basis simply by adjusting yields
on public offerings for underwriting expènse.°
The principal defect in the foregoing assumption is that fees were
paid on only about half of the direct placements surveyed by the
SEC. This means that effective yields on direct placements are be-
ing consistently overstated relative to yields on public offerings,
perhaps by as much as 10 basis points on the smaller issues and by
lesser amounts on the larger issues, e.g., by perhaps 1 or 2 basis
points on issues of $10 million and over.
When afee was paid to an underwriter. Actually, no fee was paid on about
half the direct placements and, when no fee was paid, the total cost of flotation
is represented by the figure given under "other expenses."
6Weare disregarding two things:first, the fees paid on direct placements
which would raise yields on direct placements relative to yields on public
offerings, and second, the difference in other expense which would lower yields
on direct placements relative to yields on public offerings. We are saying that
these two effects will approximately cancel each other.Direct Placements and Public Offerings 129
Procedure
In order to assess the level of yields on direct placements relative
to that on public offerings, time held constant, five steps were
taken.
1. Data were collected on all the industrial public offerings and
on a 30 per cent random sample of utility public offerings with a
face value of $2 million or more, sold from January 1, 1951,
through December 31, The data collected on each issue
were: date of offering, yield before deduction of underwriting
fees; yield after deduction of underwriting fees; total capital-
ization (X2); total interest, five-year average (X4); size of issue
(Xe); type of security (X5); industrial classification (X6); EBIT,
five-year average (X12); maturity (X13); and the ratio of pro-
forma long-term debt to pro-forma total capitalization(X15).
The basic data were obtained from Moody's and adjusted as
necessary. In the absence of data on years nonrefundable (X7) and
average term (X3), estimates were made for these two variables.
2. Industrials were separated from utilities, and the observations
deposited in the appropriate cells of the matrixes set forth in Charts
6 and 13.8
3. Yields net-to-the-issuer were then averaged over each diagonal
and quarterly "series" obtained—seven for industrials and eight
for utilities.
4. Residuals were obtained quarterly for each series by sub-
tracting yields on public offerings from yields on direct placements.
Thus, a positive residual meant a higher yield for the given class
and quarter on direct placements and a negative residual, a lower
yield.9 The residuals were then averaged algebraically within each
class, over the whole period.
The results of the averaging are given, separately for industrials
and utilities, in the first and third columns of Table 64. The residual
About 200 issues of each type, pure debt issues only.
8 The matrixes were adjusted to give full effect to the fact that some public
offerings are sold by very large companies.
° Comparisons were possible in less than half the quarters for nearly all series.130 Yieldson Corporate Debt Directly Placed
TABLE 64
Actual and Computed Yields on Direct Placements
MinusYieldson Public Offerings, by Quality





Class Actual Computed Actual Computed
1 +.45 +.33 —-- +.16
2 . +.37 +15 .+.63 +.20
3 . +.30 +.15 +.44 +.12
4 • +.08 —.03 +.29 +.19
5 —.21 —.06 —— +.05
6' —— —— +.08
TABLE 65
Actual and Computed Yields on Direct Placements Minus-





Actual Computed Actual Computed
1951 —.01 —.20 +.34 +.27
1952 +.28 +.11 +.10
1953 +.33 —.04 • +.49 '+.04
1954 • ' +.62 +.39 +.29 ' +.23
1955 +.10 —.15 '+.27 +.13
1956 +.06 +.19 +.41 +.24
1957 , +.18 +.'48 +.46 +.29
1958 +.51 +.43 +74 +.13
1959 +80 +31 +.38 +13
1960 +.50 +.35 . +23 +17
1961 .+.48 +02 +.33 +05Direct Placements and Public Offerings 131
CHART 20
Industrials and Utilities: Yields on Direct Placements Minus
Yields on Public Offerings, Actual and Computed, Classes 2,
3, and 4 Only, Annually, 1951—61
SouRcE: Table 65.
declines steadily from class to class, and for industrials becomes
negative in class 5. (Comparisons were possible for utilities for
only three classes.)
5. The quarterly observations were averaged annually,for
classes 2, 3, and 4 combined (Table 65). These annual averages
are plotted in Chart 20.10
10Neitherquarterly series for the three classes combined nor annual series
for each class separately could be constructed.
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The results raised two questions:(1) Why is the residual
positive? (2) Why, for industrials and apparently not for utilities,
does the residual decline from class to class?
Corn puted Residuals
Residuals were, of course, compared class by class. But some
possibility remained that the public offerings in any given class
were, on the average, "better" than the direct placements in the
same class. If they were, this fact might account for all or part of
the residual in favor of public offerings. In order to be sure that
everything was being held constant, residuals were computed.
1. A hundred industrial public offerings and a hundred and
twenty utility public offerings were chosen at random from the
samples described above.
2. A yield was computed for each by "plugging" the data
collected from Moody's on each X into the original quarterly
direct placement regression equations. This procedure responded
to the following question: If this particular public offering had
been sold, when it was sold, not as a public offering but rather as a
direct placement, what would the yield on it have been? The issue
was, thus, being compared with itself.11
3. Residuals were then obtained for each issue by subtracting
the actual yield on the issue (as a public offering) from the com-
puted yield. Again, a positive residual meant that the "theoretical"
yield on the issue as a direct placement was higher than the actual
yield on the issue when it was sold as a public offering.
4. These computed residuals were deposited in the appropriate
class and an average was taken within each class over the whole
period. These averages are givenby class, separately for industrials
and utilities, in the second and fourth columns of Table 64.
The results are interesting. First, holding every thing constant
has lowered the level of the residual in every class both for indus-
11 Except to the extent that X3 and X7 had been inaccurately estimated.,Direct Placements and Public Offerings 133
trials and utilities. Both sets of residuals continue to decline, though
not as systematically as before, but the conclusion does appear
warranted that the larger better-quality issues do better on the
public market, whereas smaller lesser-quality issues appear to do
better in the direct placement market. In other words, the public
market is willing to pay a premium for the issues of well-known
companies and, conversely, ,tends to exact a penalty, in the. form
of higher selling costs, on the issues of less well-known or little-
known companies. Well-known companies, are on the average
larger and of better "quality" than little-known companies.
5. Classes 2, 3, and 4 were then combined and annual averages
calculated (Chart 20). The cycle in the residual on industrials has
virtually disappeared and the upward trend is reduced. The residual
on utilities is now fluctuating very slightly around a horizontal line.
The following conclusions are inescapable:(1) .Theresidual
"existed" during the period 1951—61 both for industrials and util-
ities on the issues in fact compared. (2) The residual on both
industrials and utilities declines from class to class.
A Suggested Hypothesis
A hypothesis which would explain the above findings follows.
There were, in fact, in the period 1951—61, two weighting sys-
tems—one for public offerings and one for direct placements. The
weighting system for public offerings favored the issues of large
well-known companies, whereas the weighting system for direct
placements favored the issues of smaller lesser-known companies.
When the characteristics of the issues of large well-known com-
panies are "plugged" into regression equations derived from direct
placements, size and reputation of issuer receive less weight than
they in fact did receive in the public market. Hence the yield on
such an issue tends to be higher as a direct placement than its
actual yield as a public offering. But this effect tends to be less in
the lower classes simply because, as we go from class to class, size
of issuer declines and the issuer itself tends to be less well-known.134 Yields on Corporate Debt Directly Placed
This hypothesis would explain the tendency of the residual to
decline from class to class. And the residual shows itself to be
positive on the whole, over time, simply because the figures in
Table 65 were derived from the higher classes, i.e., the classes in
which public offerings predominate.12
In brief, the foregoing analysis suggests that the direct placement
and public markets tend to serve different classes of customers. The
direct placement market tends to serve small and medium-sized
lesser-known issuers and the public market, the larger better-known
issuers.'3
Last, some large well-known companies directly placed their
issues during the period. The foregoing analysis suggests that such
issuers could have done better, in terms of price, in the public
market. Therefore, the residuals given in Table 64, especially for
classes 1 through 3, are estimates of the value put by such issuers
on the nonprice advantages of direct placements.
12 The foregoing hypothesis implies, of course, that if the characteristics of
direct placements were "plugged" into a series of regression equations derived
from public offerings, the residuals so obtained would favor direct placements
during the period in question. Unfortunately, this test was beyond the resources
of the present study.
13 Perhaps the extent to which the markets in fact compete depends on the
level of interest rates. When money is tight the direct placement market may
compete littleif at all for the relatively low-yielding issues of the large well-
known companies, and vice versa when money is easy.